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Conflict prevention must begin as a part of post-conflict reconstruction, and NATO
and the EU have political responsibility in implementation this process.
Peace-building activities do not replace humanitarian and development activities in
countries emerging from crises. Stabilizing the situation and preventing the
recurrence of conflict in a post-intervention or post-war society will be needed for a
long term. The immensity and complexity of the post-conflict rehabilitation would be
needed to rethink the vital nature of the Euro-Atlantic solidarity and more
coordination between the two sides of the Atlantic.
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1. Introduction
There are many reasons to agree with the state-
ment 'that the obvious lesson - that conflict preven-
tion must begin as part of post-conflict reconstruction
- is seldom drawn' I. Dealing with this problem among
the plethora of issues to make the world a safer place
for life and social progress calls for greater solidarity
of those who can draft and implement adequate strat-
egies, and provide enough resources. The countries
of the Euro-Atlantic security zone and their institu-
tions -NATO and the EU, have a special political re-
sponsibility in implementing an effective post-con-
flict rehabilitation. Adjusting the threat perception
systems of Europe and North America will have the
beneficial effect of not only remaining intact during
eventual interventions, but also in the aftermath of
the conflict. Certainly, Euro-Atlantic solidarity is an-
other crucial component in the mechanism of post-
conflict rehabilitation strategic efforts. In a similar
way, probably, some changes would be needed in the
very conceptual model of 'post-conflict rehabilitation'
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to adjust the present strategic approach. All three ad-
justments would require strenuous activity and they
will not fail only if the worth of Euro-Atlantic soli-
darity is fairly and objectively calculated: the two sides
of the Atlantic are in bad need of each other to cope
with the immense task of getting a global world, which
is secure to carry out the multitude of global activi-
ties. The measure between cooperation and healthy
competition of Europe and North America is the ma-
turity test of the present politicians and thinkers of
the two continents. Working together and/or in a co-
ordinated manner on post-conflict reconstruction in
various places of the globe has the potential of pro-
ducing a positive net effect, including rehabilitating
the bruised relations during the last year between parts
of Europe and the USA.
2. Post-Conflict Reconstruction -
a 'Must' of Present-Day Conflict
Management
In 1998 the UN Secretary General described
the nature and the necessity of post-conflict peace-
building activities:' these are actions, undertaken at
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the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and pre-
vent a recurrence of armed confrontations. The con-
solidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict re-
quires more than purely diplomatic and military ac-
tion, and that an integrated peace-building effort is
needed to address the various factors which have
caused or are threatening a conflict. The peace-build-
ing effort may involve the creation or strengthening
of national institutions, monitoring elections, pro-
moting human rights, providing for reintegration and
rehabilitation programs, as well as creating condi-
tions for resumed development. Peace-building does
not replace ongoing humanitarian and development
activities in countries emerging from crises. Its aims
are to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in
ways that are designed to reduce the risk of a re-
sumption of conflict and contribute to creating con-
ditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruc-
tion and recovery. In post-conflict societies recon-
ciliation should be encouraged; respect for human
rights must be demonstrated; political inclusiveness
must be fostered and national unity -promoted; safe,
smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of
refugees and displaced persons must be ensured; ex-
combatants must be reintegrated into society; the
availability of small arms should be curtailed, and
domestic and international resources for economic
recovery and reconstruction must be mobilized. Each
of these tasks is linked to every other and success
will require a concerted and coordinated effort on
all fronts. The authors of the Report of the Interna-
tional Commission on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty 'The Responsibility To Protect' of December
200 I point to the main issues that confront policy
makers in exercising the responsibility to rebuild in
the three most immediate crucial areas: security.jus-
tice and economic development.'
The experience of the 1990s and the begin-
ning of the new century shows, that there is no sub-
stitute for this clear post-conflict or post-interven-
tion strategy. The international intervention in post-
conflict countries will be needed in the longer-term
to reach stability and prevent new conflicts. How-
ever, faced with a growing number of post-conflict
countries that the international community, mostly
the Euro-Atlantic community, will have to deal with
in the next years, adjustments of the post-conflict
rehabilitation strategy become indispensable.
The Three Dimensions of the Post-Conflict
Rehabilitation Strategy Adjustment:
a) Carry Out a Threat Perception Adjustment
'Operation'
There is no doubt for any student of security
issues how significant the security threat perception
is for further conceptual, political, strategic and in-
stitutional reactions for coping with the coming dan-
ger. The Western unity in perceiving the threat of
the rising Kosovo crisis led to a united policy and
support to the NATO's actions. This largely com-
pensated the weakness of the missing clear UN Se-
curity Council mandate, obstructed by three of its
members, two of which were permanent.
This unfortunately did not happen in the cri-
sis in Iraq. While on 12 September 200 I the US
Administration saw the danger stemming from Iraq
and logically, the response to the challenge of ter-
rorism was linked to regime change in Baghdad, some
of the leading European states preferred to rely on
their own experience in dealing with terrorism and
religious fundamentalism. The reliance on past les-
sons was additionally stimulated by a sense of the
limits of their own capabilities, calling for more cau-
tious reactions. Hence, some Europeans did not
choose quick military solutions in dealing away with
the Iraqi regime, despite its horrific human rights
record, but rather the compromise and reliance on
containing Saddam. The United States perceived Iraq
as a direct threat that could create problems in thc
short-term while some of the EU leading countries
calculated it as a long-term issue. Washington con-
sidered military force was necessary while some
European countries preferred the continuation of the
political and diplomatic pressure on Baghdad. Logi-
cally these perceptions and assessments generated
the unilateralism vs. multilateraJism question in
world politics, the divergences within the Alliance
and weakening of the institutional link between Eu-
rope and North America.
Such weakening may have disastrous conse-
quences for global stability and European security -
a development that should be prevented. Julian
Lindley-French is correct in stating that 'if the U. S.
succeeds (in Iraq) then the credibility of America
and the broader West will have been immeasurably
strengthened in the minds of those inimical to both.
If the U. S. fails then those who killed thousands of
Europeans and Americans on 911] will have been
tragically emboldened'." That is why a security per-
ception adjustment process between the two sides
of the Atlantic must become an integral part of the
complex decision-making process of NATO and of
the member and partner states.
b) Adjust the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Model
StabiJising the situation and preventing the
recurrence of conflict in a post-intervention or post-
war society will be needed for long. The difficult
choices post-conflict re-constructors have to make
and the lack of efficiency as past experience shows
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would not always require a full-spectrum of activi-
ties to rehabilitate the respective societies. Further-
more, the international community is not always
ready to deliver support that would meet all the tasks
of rehabilitating a war-tom society. Bosnia is one of
the few cases where the international community
constructed a post-conflict rehabilitation model and
provided the resources to bring it to life. At the end
of the day the international community faced rather
modest results, which generates negative feedbacks
at the realism of the model that was applied. Of
course in Bosnia no deadline was set when the for-
eign troops should leave. However, could this be the
option of the international community in the various
places of the world where it is involved and would
necessarily have to get involved?
A strategic re-adjustment, according to us,
would require pulling away from any maximal tasks
of rehabilitating a post-conflict society.' It is just a
fact of life that the Euro-Atlantic community cannot
involve in a short-to-mid-term process of integration
all war-torn societies as this happened to a certain
extent in the Balkans. This is hardly the chance to
draft all the elements of a re-thought model of post-
conflict rehabilitation that would satisfy both the need
of stability and of economy of investments. But a new
and more realistic strategy of implementing the post-
conflict rehabilitation model is more than necessary.
The basic requirements of this transformation of the
model should be, however, never compromising on
fundamental human rights, and generating in the short-
term local national mobilisation to assume the respon-
sibilities of the leadership of the reconstruction activ-
ity. When this is obviously impossible, the interna-
tional community will have to carry out both scaling-
down of its activities and investing military presence,
management and financial resources. And lastly, the
international community will still have to have the
courage to accept that there are certain territories,
populated by people, which should be left temporar-
ily to suggest themselves what form of social interac-
tion may give the opportunity to the outside world to
provide some help.
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c) Upgrade Euro-Atlantic Solidarity
Considering the immensity and complexity of
the post-conflict rehabilitation tasks worldwide it
would be needed to re-think the vital nature of the
Euro-Atlantic solidarity in carrying out the tasks of
reconstruction. More coordination, probably some
division of labour would be indispensable between
the two sides of the Atlantic, but hardly a substitute
for genuine Euro-Atlantic solidarity could be pro-
posed. Commonality of values requires an additional
- conceptual, impetus to reinvigorate this solidarity:
Europe and the United States need each other not in
competition between themselves, but in cooperation.
Otherwise any thought or feeling of solidarity risks
to be neutralised easily in the midst of any new round
of competing visions, interests or positions. One must
not expect uniformity of perceptions and reactions
to what is going on in the world, but cooperative
attitudes and minimum solidarity are just thc rational
choice. Non-stopping dialogue within Europe and
within the Euro-Atlantic community is the guaran-
tee that solidarity will continuously be nourished and
re-vitalised. Otherwise, the root causes of the really
big problems of the world will never be reached and
solved.
3. Conclusions
The post-conflict rehabilitation situations 111
the broader Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia and
other places of the world where NATO and EU will
have to cooperate may be hard to predict and enlist.
The Western Balkans is still on the high priority list
of the EU and NATO post-intervention and post-war
rehabilitation activities. A deeper involvement ofthc
UN in the efforts of post-war rehabilitation would,
probably, be needed more and more. However, UN's
efforts would remain ineffective without adequate
re-adjustments of the post-conflict rehabi litation
strategy and without enough solidarity between the
two sides of the Atlantic. •
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